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RESPONSE TO RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Counterdefendants' restatement of the issues on appeal in Respondents' Brief 
("ROB") fails to address, respond to or argue whether Boling's statutory tort claims fall 
within the scope of the arbitration clause of the subscription agreement (Issue No. One 
in Appellant's Brief ("AOB") at p. 22), which is therefore conceded by 
Counterdefendants in this appeal. 
Counterdefendants' first restatement of the issues on appeal is unduly narrow in 
scope to Idaho contract law and only presents one of the five theories pursuant to which 
an arbitration clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory. See AOB at p. 27. 
Counterdefendants' second restatement of the issue on appeal misapplies waiver 
by estoppel and misconstrues Idaho law of judicial estoppel for purposes of seeking 
arbitration, which was developed in AOB at pp. 34-39. 
Counterdefendants' second restatement of the issue on appeal also unduly 
restricts the relevant facts upon which judicial estoppel is to be analyzed in this appeal. 
RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees because the ROB provides no 
factual support that this case "was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation" or that Boling's arguments on appeal are 
"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior decisions rendered by this Court." 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Five theories exist in Idaho to compel a non-signatory party to 
arbitration. 
Counterdefendants acknowledge that in Arthur Andersen v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 
624, 631-32 (2009) "traditional principles" of state law allow a contract to be enforced 
by or against nonparties to the contract through "assumption, piercing the corporate 
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and 
estoppel," ROB at p. 6. These "traditional principles" basically mirror the five theories 
quoted in the Thomson-CSF case. 
Moreover, subsequent to the Carlisle case, this Court in Wattenbarger v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 316, 246 P .3d 961, 969 n. 1 (Dec. 2010), 
reiterated that the applicable state and federal legal principles of arbitration law are one 
and the same. Thus, this Court recognizes that the five theories pursuant to which an 
arbitration clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory (See AOB at p. 28) is 
applicable for the state of Idaho as federal legal principles that are indistinguishable 
from Idaho's own arbitration principles. 
1. Counterdefendants are bound by the arbitration clause based on their close 
relationship with the Company and intertwined facts with the Agreement. 
Counterdefendants do not dispute in ROB that they had a "preexisting 
relationship" as agents for the Company in the formation, distribution, maintenance and 
performance of the 2008 Note Program. Instead, Counterdefendants inappropriately 
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rely upon General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 
696-697 (1975) as authority that an agent by making a contract only on behalf of a 
disclosed principal, whom he was power to bind, does not thereby become liable for its 
non-performance. ROB at p. 7. However, in the instant case Boling is not seeking 
liability against the Counterdefendants for the Agreement's non-performance, e.g. 
breach of contract claim. But rather Boling is seeking enforcement of the arbitration 
clause against Counterdefendants to assert claims based on Counterdefendants' own 
alleged tortuous activities intertwined with the Agreement. 
Since both Boling and the Company agreed to the arbitration clause in the 
Agreement, a mutuality of remedy exists for that contractual term. 1 Boling may 
arbitrate any claims asserted against the Company based on the Counterdefendants' 
conduct made in the course and scope of their agency relationship. 2 
Boling, as a willing signatory, seeking to arbitrate with Counterdefendants, as a 
non-signatory that is unwilling, must establish at least one of the five theories described 
"[I]f there were no mutuality ofremedy requirement, the seller--which is usually 
the offeree in the real estate sales context--would have absolutely no incentive to initial 
the arbitration provision and thereby bind itself to arbitrate disputes." Marcus & 
Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. v. Hock Investment Co., 68 Cal.App.4th 
83, 91, fn. 6 (1998). 
2 When contracting parties agree to arbitrate all disputes "under or with respect 
to" a contract (as they did in the instant case), they generally intend to include disputes 
about their agents' actions because "[a ]s a general rule, the actions of a corporate agent 
on behalf of the corporation are deemed the corporation's acts." In re Merrill Lynch 
Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex., 2007). 
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in Thomson-CSF, SA. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.1995). 3 
This Court previously stated in Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer 
Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235 (2005) that "a nonsignatory can be bound to an 
arbitration agreement under ordinary principles of contract and agency," citing the 
Thomson-CSP case. See AOB at pp. 28 and 30; See also Mance v. Mercedes-Benz 
USA, 901 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted). 
This Court further cites in Dan Wiebold the case of Westra v. Marcus & 
Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 759 (2005) as an 
example of the arbitration principles under the Thomson-CSF case. AOB at p. 28. 
Although the Westra case involves the enforcement of arbitration by a non-signatory, 
the Westra court states "[a] nonsignatory to an agreement to arbitrate may be required to 
arbitrate, and may invoke arbitration against a party, if a preexisting confidential 
relationship, such as an agency relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to arbitrate 
upon the nonsignatory." (citations omitted) Westra at p. 765. Thus, with establishing 
one of the five theories described in Thomson-CSP case, an arbitration clause can be 
3 The federal courts have identified five theories pursuant to which an arbitration 
clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory: "1) incorporation by reference; 2) 
assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel. "Boucher v. Alliance 
Title Co., Inc., 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 268 (2005), quoting Thomson-CSP, SA. v. 
American Arbitration Ass'n., 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
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enforced by or against a non-signatory under Idaho law. 4 
In the instant case, the district court ruled "[t]o the extent that the named 
individuals were acting in the course and scope of their agency for their principal, their 
actions as agents bind their principal but do not convert the agents to parties to the 
contract." [R 576, lines 5-7] However, the district court failed to express any analysis, 
finding or ruling regarding enforcing the arbitration clause against the non-signatory 
Counterdefendants under the theories of agency or equitable estoppel described in 
Thomson--CSF case. 
Counterdefendants have a close relationship with the Company, as owners, 
officers and agents. AOB at pp. 30-32. 5 Also, the operative facts against the 
Counterdefendants are inherently inseparable, "intimately founded in and intertwined 
with the underlying contract obligations" while acting in the course and scope of their 
agency relationship in the formation, distribution, performance and maintenance of the 
Agreement and 2008 Note Program. 6 AOB at pp. 34-38. This "close relationship" and 
intertwined facts provide a sufficient nexus to justify enforcing the arbitration clause 
against the non-signatory Counterdefendants. 
4 Counterdefendants fail to mention or respond to the Dan Wiebold and Westra 
cases in ROB. 
5 The Company is solely owned by the Manager, Counterdefendant Clearwater 
REI, LLC. [R 401] 
6 Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, claims against the non-signatory 
must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the 
underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause. 
Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc., 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 715 
(2010)- citing Goldman v. KPMG, LLP, 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 217-218 (2009). 
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Furthermore, it is equitable to compel arbitration against the non-signatory 
Counterdefendants, as agents for and along with the Company. Counterdefendants' 
alleged actionable conduct is attributable to and may create liability for the Company, 
which if arbitrated in a complete proceeding with all interested parties eliminates the 
risk of inconsistent rulings. 7 
Counterdefendants' reliance on the case of Elgohary v. Herrera, 2013 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 2116, *12-13 (Tex. App. Mar. 5, 2013) lacks a focus to the issues in this case. 
The issue on appeal presented in the Elgohary case is "who properly decides the issue 
of arbitrability against a non-signatory-the trial court or the arbitrator." Elgohary at 
* 1. Counterdefendants cite "[i]f the party resisting arbitration is not a signatory to the 
contract, his status as an agent of the signatory entity will not bind him to the arbitration 
provision. ROB at pp. 9-10. This citation is made in the context of Elgohary's issue on 
appeal, i.e. who decides the issue of arbitrability. Elgohary holds that the court should 
decide the issue of arbitrability and then remands the case back to the trial court to 
"conduct an independent review to determine whether arbitration could nonetheless be 
compelled because of either successor liability under the contract or under any of the six 
theories for compelling a non-signatory to arbitrate set forth in In re Merrill Lynch, 235 
S. W.3d at 191. Absent such an independent review of arbitrability by the trial court, its 
7 At oral argument the district court stated "an agent acting in the scope of his or 
her agency binds his or her principal, and if the principal has an agreement to arbitrate, 
then the acts of the agents will be evaluated in the context of the arbitration." [RT 
22:10-14] 
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action in denying the application to confirm and vacating the arbitration award against 
Herrera was premature." Elgohary at *7. 
Thus, Counterdefendants' reliance on the Elgohary case and the ordinary agency 
principles in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002) is misplaced 
because these cases look to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute and never 
thereafter reviewed the facts under the five theories described in Thomson-CSF for 
binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements under theories that arise out of 
common law principles of contract and agency law. 
Counterdefendants also wrongfully criticize Boling's reliance on Sunkist Soft 
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757-758 (11th Cir. 1993) re 
equitable estoppel and claims intertwined with contractual obligations, as being bad law 
after the Carlisle case. ROB at pp. 11-12. As discussed supra, 1) the Carlisle case did 
not eliminate "traditional principles" of state law to allow a contract to be enforced by 
or against nonparties to the contract, and 2) this Court continues to acknowledge the 
five theories described in Thomson-CSF for binding non-signatories to arbitration 
agreements. 
Finally, Counterdefendants incorrectly rely upon New Mexico's 3-part version 
of waiver by estoppel (a different principle) in the case of THI of NM at Hobbs Ctr., 
LLC v. Patton, 2012 WL 112216 (D.N.M. 2012) at *10 to assert that Boling has not 
complied with the equitable estoppel principle in Idaho for binding a non-signatory to 
an agreement to arbitrate. ROB at p. 18-19. The Hobbs court later identifies the 
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equitable estoppel principal of collusion in Lenox Maclaren Surgical Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 2011 WL 5545420 (10th Cir. 2011) at *6 (unpublished opinion) as 
instructive in determining whether a non-signatory is bound by an agreement to 
arbitrate. 8 Hobbs at *14-15. In the instant case, waiver by estoppel is not the issue and 
Counterdefendants' reliance thereon is inapposite. 
2. Counterdefendants are bound by the arbitration clause based on a third-
party beneficiary relationship with the Company. 
Counterdefendants' actionable conduct has a "significant relationship" to the 
formation and performance of the Agreement between the Company and Boling, 
whereby Counterdefendants were intended direct economic benefit derived from the 
Agreement as disclosed therein. See AOB at p. 33. 
Boling executed the Agreement with the disclosed "significant relationship" and 
economic benefits between the Company and Counterdefendants. 
Having taken their intended fruits of the Agreement with Boling in the form of 
fees, employment compensation and use of the loan proceeds for projects by other 
Clearwater entities owned or operated by the Counterdefendants, an intended direct 
benefit was conferred on the non-signatory Counterdefendants as a result of the 
Agreement, making the non-signatory Counterdefendants a third party beneficiary of 
8 
"[A]llegations of collusion will support estoppel only when they establish that 
the claims against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the 
obligations imposed by the contract containing the arbitration clause." Hobbs at* 14 
citing Medtronic, 2011 WL5545420, at *6. 
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the Agreement and arbitration clause therein. 9 
B. Boling has Not Waived his Right to Compel Arbitration 
1. No waiver of right to arbitrate exists. 
The party seeking the "heavy burden" to prove a waiver of the right to 
arbitration must show: "(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) 
acts inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing 
arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts." (underline added) Bauscher v. 
Brookstone Securities, Inc., 2012 WL 3100383 at *5 (D. Idaho, 2012) (citing Fisher v. 
A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1986) These requirements are set 
forth in the conjunctive, so all requirements must be met before a waiver of right to 
arbitrate is established. 
Counterdefendants did not set forth in their opposition to Boling's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration or in ROB any prejudice that existed under the third requirement. 
Counterdefendants do not establish that volumes of discovery were produced in this 
case. Moreover, the burden of participating in discovery is inadequate to show 
prejudice. See, Rauscher at *6. Thus, a waiver of right to arbitrate is not established. 
2. No judicial estoppel exists. 
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"In order to recover as a third party beneficiary, it is not necessary that the 
individual be named and identified as an individual although that is usually sufficient; a 
third party may enforce a contract if he can show he is a member of a limited class for 
whose benefit it was made. (Citation omitted). Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 
462, 464 (1978) (finding intent to benefit third party class of merchant's within a local 
improvement district was evident on the face of the contract) 
13 
Judicial estoppel is the concept "that a litigant who obtains a judgment, 
advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn statements is 
judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to 
obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or 
subject matter." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235 (2008) (citing Loomis v. Church, 
76 Idaho 87, 93-94 (1954). 
In general, there are three elements for a court to consider in evaluating whether 
to apply judicial estoppel against a party: "(1) whether a party's later position is 'clearly 
inconsistent' with its original position; (2) whether the party has successfully persuaded 
the court of the earlier position, and (3) whether allowing the inconsistent position 
would allow the party to 'derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on 
the opposing party."' United States v. Ibrahim, 522 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2008). 
These requirements are set forth in the conjunctive, so all requirements must be met 
before judicial estoppel is established. 
Any purported inconsistent position(s) set forth in Boling's Opposition to 
Petition to Stay Arbitration does not establish any waiver, supra, or judicial estoppel 
because 1) no sworn statements were made, 2) the district court did not rule in favor of 
Boling, and 3) the district court makes no mention of or relies on such position(s) in 
ruling on the matter. See R 278-279. Also, Boling has not derived an unfair advantage 
or impose an unfair detriment on Counterdefendants, based on similar grounds, supra, 
that no prejudice under a waiver of right to arbitrate theory exists. 
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C. Counterdefendants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because 1) the 
lawsuit was not "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." and 2) Boling's arguments on appeal are not deemed to be frivolous as 
"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior decisions rendered by this Court." 
On September 12, 2012, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Stay Arbitration were heard by the district court. At that time, the Motion to 
Dismiss was denied. [R 303, i! 39] Boling had successfully defended his counterclaims 
from dismissal, thereby establishing their merits at the pleading stage. 
On February 6, 2013, at the time of oral argument on the underlying Motion to 
Compel Arbitration, the district court invited Boling to accept a Rule 54 (B) 
certification of the issue on appeal. 
"THE COURT: I don't see that you have an 
agreement between these parties to arbitrate. And while I 
have no question that to the extent that in the agreement 
you appropriately have, that you already have that does 
require arbitration, there is certainly no question that a 
company can be bound by its officers and agents, but then 
you are still talking about the principal being the person 
or entity compelled to arbitrate. 
So I simply don't think there is an adequate basis to 
require arbitration. I would be willing to consider giving 
you a 54(B) certificate if you wish to raise that issue on 
appeal." [RT 10:8-20] * * * 
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"But I will give you a 54(B) certificate if you desire 
so that you can pursue these issues, because it's obvious 
that it is a threshold issue, and as you frame it, it seems 
to me that it would make some sense to allow you the 
option to pursue it with the record that you now have, 
which is a better record, to pursue these issues on 
appeal if you would desire to do so." [RT 23:12-19] 
(emphasis added) 
The district court expressly acknowledges Boling as having a threshold issue 
with a better record to pursue on appeal. Additionally, the substantive points and 
authorities in Appellant's Brief and Appellant's Reply Brief further speak to the non-
frivolous nature of the appeal. 
Consequently, Boling has established that his case is not frivolous, unreasonable 
or unfounded and that this appeal presents a threshold issue supported by credible legal 
authority. As such, Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Boling seeks to conserve judicial resources and ensure consistent substantive 
rulings on his claims by compelling arbitration of Counterdefendants along with the 
Company. Boling submitted in support of his motion to compel arbitration admissible 
evidence, including newly discovered evidence in discovery on a new and different 
motion that warrants a different conclusion to the district court's 10/16/12 ruling [R 
278-279] and 217113 ruling [R 575-577]. Based on the foregoing, Boling respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the district court's 217/13 ruling [R 575-577] with 
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direction to compel arbitration against Counterdefendants, and each of them, based on 
Boling's initial demand for arbitration filed with the AAA on February 15, 2012. 
Furthermore, Boling requests that Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Dated: August 9, 2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on August 9, 2013, I served the following document(s) in this 
action: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
by sending two true copies thereof by ELECTRONIC SERVICE pursuant to 
LR.C.P, Rule 5 (b) (E), l.A.R, Rule 20 and agreement between the parties addressed to 
the party(s) served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey - rar@raineylawoffice.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs - Counterdefendants - Respondents Clearwater REI, 
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J. Benak and Rob Ruebel. 
The transmission of said document( s) to each party served was reported as 
complete and without error within a reasonable time after said transmission. 
Dated: August 9, 2013 
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